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Abstract
The UK government made three key human rights-related commitments in the Good Friday Agreement, the
basis for the restoration of  devolution and transition from conflict to peace in Northern Ireland: to
incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern Ireland law; to consider proposals
for a regional Bill of  Rights; and to ensure compliance with the state’s international obligations in the region.
While ECHR compliance is required of  devolved institutions by the constitutional legislation, the prospects
of  a Bill of  Rights being enacted appears limited and oversight of  compliance with other international
obligations is unsatisfactorily placed in political, rather than judicial, hands. Consequently, protection of
socio-economic rights beyond those covered by the ECHR is weak. This paper argues that judicial protection
of  socio-economic rights – whether in the form of  a Bill of  Rights or the incorporation of  additional human
rights agreements into Northern Ireland law – is required for full implementation of  the Agreement. It then
considers the implications of  such a step for social security in the region. The concluding section highlights
political and fiscal implications that would have to be considered.
Introduction and context
The Good Friday Agreement
1 was signed by most major political groupings in Northern
Ireland and two national governments, then endorsed by the electorate in simultaneous
referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic of  Ireland in 1998.2 The Agreement was
struck in pursuit of  two main objectives. First, to restore devolved government to Northern
Ireland – the world’s first ‘perfect example of  devolution’3 but without stable regional
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1 Northern Ireland Office, Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations (Cmnd 3883, NIO 1998).
2 Strictly speaking, the referendum in the Republic of  Ireland, although generally portrayed as an endorsement
of  the Agreement, approved only the amendment of  that state’s constitution as proposed by the Agreement:
see N Whyte, ‘The 1998 Referendums’ (ARK 14 January 2001/17 February 2002) <www.ark.ac.uk/
elections/fref98.htm> accessed 26 August 2014.
3 ‘An American professor’ cited by J I Cook, ‘Financial Relations between the Exchequers of  the United
Kingdom and Northern Ireland’ in F H Newark, J I Cook, D A E Harkness, L G P Preer and D G Neill,
Devolution of  Government: The Experiment in Northern Ireland (George Allen & Unwin 1953) 18.
representative institutions since 1972.4 Second, to finally resolve the ‘Irish question’ in UK
politics by putting in place a wider peace settlement.5
The concepts of  human rights and equality are central to the Agreement, reflecting the
widely recognised role of  inequality, human rights abuses and discrimination as features and
drivers of  conflict in Northern Ireland.6 However, their prominence is also consistent with
a wider concern with human rights and equality of  opportunity that found repeated
legislative expression throughout 13 years of  New Labour government in the UK.7 Three
Agreement provisions are of  most interest to this paper. The first, incorporation of  the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into Northern Ireland law, has been
delivered.8 The second, the appointment of  a commission to identify supplementary rights
that require judicial protection on the basis of  ‘the particular circumstances of  Northern
Ireland’9 has resulted in the publication of  recommendations,10 but not their
implementation. Finally, the stipulation that Parliament should ‘legislate as necessary to
ensure the United Kingdom’s international obligations are met in respect of  Northern
Ireland’ has received comparatively little attention to date, but will be crucial to the present
discussion.11
The context for this article is a long-standing impasse in the region’s five-party Northern
Ireland Executive (the Executive) regarding a proposed Welfare Reform Bill.12 The Bill as
originally presented to the Northern Ireland Assembly would have continued the long-
established practice of  operating parallel but in most respects identical systems of  social
security for Great Britain and for Northern Ireland13 by replicating reforms approved by
the UK Parliament for Great Britain.14 The Bill was introduced to the Assembly in October
2012, completing committee stage in February of  the following year. After a two-year
hiatus, the legislative process resumed in February 2015, but following the withdrawal of
support by Sinn Féin – one of  the two main political parties in the regional Executive – the
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4 For an overview of  key episodes, both violent and political, in the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’, see CAIN 
Web Service, ‘Key Events of  the Northern Ireland Conflict’ <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/> accessed 
28 August 2013.
5 For an overview, see D G Byrne, The Irish Question and British Politics, 1866–1996 (Macmillan 1996); P Adelman
and R Pearce, Great Britain and the Irish Question 1798–1921 (Hodder Education 2005); on the search for a
settlement, see B Hadfield, ‘The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty and the State of  the Union’ (1998) Public
Law 599; M McWilliams, ‘Reflections of  a Participant’ in Mapping the Rollback? Human Rights Provisions of  the
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 15 Years On, Report of  a conference at Queen’s University Belfast (26 April 2013).
6 P Hillyard, B Rolston and M Tomlinson, Poverty and Conflict in Ireland: An International Perspective (Institute of
Public Administration/Combat Poverty Agency 2005); B Dickson, ‘Counter-insurgency and Human Rights in
Northern Ireland’ (2009) 32(3) Journal of  Strategic Studies 475; C Harvey and D Russell, ‘A New Beginning
for Human Rights Protection in Northern Ireland?’ (2009) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 748.
7 Human Rights Act 1998, c 42; Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, c 34; Disability Discrimination Act
2005, c 13; Equality Act 2006, c 3; Equality Act 2010, c 15.
8 The Agreement (n 1) c 6, para 2; Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 6(2).
9 The Agreement (n 1) c 6, para 4.
10 NIHRC, ‘A Bill of  Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of  State for Northern Ireland’
(NIHRC 2008).
11 The Agreement (n 1) c 3, para 33(b).
12 Welfare Reform Bill (NIA Bill 13/11–15).
13 A partial legislative basis for this approach can be found in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 87; for
discussion, see M Simpson, ‘Social Security Parity in Northern Ireland: Developing Constitutional Principles
through Firefighting?’ (2015) 22(1) Journal of  Social Security Law 31.
14 Welfare Reform Act 2012, c 5.
Bill failed to pass final stage in May of  that year.15 The main cause of  the delay appears to
have been the inability of  the Executive parties to reconcile the view that the reforms
included in the Bill represent an unjustifiable assault on the living standards of  benefit
claimants with fear that anything other than continued adherence to the Westminster model
would represent an unsustainable financial burden for the region16 and the appeal to
political unionism of  the principle ‘that an individual here in Northern Ireland should
receive the same level of  benefit, subject to the same conditions, as an individual elsewhere
in the UK’.17
Discontent with the UK government agenda has been expressed by ministers in all three
devolved regions.18 However, the Northern Ireland Assembly is in the unique position of
having devolved competence for social security19 and is therefore currently the only
regional legislature with the option of  taking a different approach.20 This paper examines
the potential impact of  the Agreement’s human rights provisions on the outcome of  the
debate as to the desirability of  emulating reform in Great Britain. It argues that current
obligations in respect of  the ECHR rights should give regional legislators cause to
reconsider one central aspect of  the reform proposals, namely the sanctions that may be
imposed on claimants who fail to meet conditions attached to receipt of  benefit. However,
equivalent judicial protection to socio-economic rights also protected by international law,
but not incorporated into UK law, could have a further-reaching impact on the practice of
maintaining parity. Given the opposition of  unionist political parties and the UK
government to the implementation in their current form of  proposals for a Northern
Ireland Bill of  Rights, it is argued that the Agreement provision on compliance with
international law in the region represents an alternative, and potentially more persuasive,
vehicle for the protection of  socio-economic rights.
The article begins with consideration of  the nature of  human rights and whether, as has
previously been claimed, a qualitative difference exists between civil and political rights and
social and economic rights that justifies or requires differential treatment in law. This
proposition having been rejected, section 2 provides an overview of  the human rights
provisions of  the Agreement, which are subsequently examined in turn. Following
discussion of  the limited (though real) potential for use of  the ECHR in defence of  socio-
economic rights and stalled progress towards a Northern Ireland Bill of  Rights, the
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15 See Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Welfare Reform Bill’ (Northern Ireland Assembly 2015)
<www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/legislation/primary-legislation-current-bills/welfare-reform-
bill> accessed 24 March 2015. Sinn Fein’s position is outlined in Sinn Fein, ‘Welfare: The Facts’ (Sinn Fein
2015) < www.sinnfein.ie/files/2015/Welfare-The-Facts.pdf> accessed 24 March 2015.
16 D Birrell and A M Gray, ‘A View from Northern Ireland’ in N Yeates, T Haux, R Jawad and M Kilkey (eds),
In Defence of  Welfare: The Impacts of  the Spending Review (Social Policy Association 2011) 49; P Robinson, NIA
Deb 9 October 2012, p 18; S Hamilton, NIA Deb 21 January 2014, vol 91, no 2, 3–4, 8–10; A Maskey,
‘Hamilton Acting as Tory Cheerleader on Cuts – Alex Maskey’ (Sinn Fein 16 March 2014)
<www.sinnfein.ie/contents/29353> accessed 17 March 2014.
17 N McCausland in Committee for Social Development, Welfare Reform Bill: Ministerial Briefing (Official Report,
Northern Ireland Assembly 31 January 2013) 2.
18 N Sturgeon, Scot Parl Deb 22 December 2011, session 4, cols 4941, 4943; Hamilton (n 16) 10; J Cuthbert and
V Gething, ‘Written Statement – Tackling Poverty Action Plan 2013’ (Welsh Government 2013)
<wales.gov.uk/about/cabinet/cabinetstatements/2013/tacklingpoverty/?lang=en> accessed 14 April 2014;
N Sturgeon, ‘Foreword from the Deputy First Minister’ in Scottish Government, Child Poverty Strategy for
Scotland: Our Approach 2014–2017 (Scottish Government 2014).
19 Social security features in the Scottish list of  reserved powers and is absent from the Welsh list of  delegated
powers – see Scotland Act 1998, c 46, sch 5; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32, sch 5.
20 The Scottish Parliament’s likely future competences in the field of  social security are set out in Scotland
Office, Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement (Cm 8990, Scotland Office 2015).
prospects of  the Agreement provision on the UK’s international law obligations
underpinning more rigorous protection of  socio-economic rights are then considered.
Finally, section 4 examines the likely practical implications for policymaking of  a judicially
enforceable obligation to comply with international law in the context of  the current
welfare reform controversy. It is concluded that, if  the ECHR rights construct a persuasive
argument against one aspect of  envisaged reform, a general requirement to comply with the
socio-economic rights instruments could raise wider questions about the appropriateness to
Northern Ireland of  the new approach in Great Britain. Although the principle of  non-
retrogression in socio-economic rights might prove difficult to argue before the courts,
clearer statements on income security can be found across the various international
instruments.
1 Civil and political rights versus socio-economic rights: a false dichotomy?
A theme central to this paper is the differential position in UK law of  the ECHR,
primarily associated with the protection of  civil and political rights, and other
international agreements more explicitly concerned with social and economic rights. At
face value, this appears to mirror the oft-repeated contention that socio-economic rights
differ qualitatively from civil and political rights and are consequently less suited to
judicial enforcement. This section briefly examines the grounds for this contention,
which are considered to be limited, before outlining the basis for justiciability or non-
justiciability of  a right in the UK specifically.
Claims of  the non-justiciability of  socio-economic rights21 tend to emphasise that they
are positive rights, requiring deliberate state intervention and thus a political decision to
allocate resources,22 not negative rights requiring only non-interference with liberty, as civil
and political rights are often portrayed.23 This argument sits uneasily alongside the fact that
institutions for the exercise of  political rights (representative bodies) and for upholding civil
rights (courts) are not without cost. If  no government has questioned whether the
resources allocated should be maintained (a questionable assertion given criticism of  the
cost of  local government and the courts),24 this is ‘a matter of  political culture and
contingency’, not the innate nature of  such rights.25 So-called negative rights may
themselves imply positive obligations such as a remedy for infringement,26 not mere non-
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21 For discussion, see G McKeever and F Ni Aolain, ‘Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Enforcing Socio
Economic Rights in Northern Ireland’ (2004) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 158; C Gearty, ‘Against
Judicial Enforcement’ in C Gearty and V Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Hart 2011); J King, Judging Social
Rights (CUP 2012).
22 For discussion of  where the line between law and politics should be drawn, see King (n 21) 123.
23 R Plant, ‘Citizenship, Rights and Welfare’ in A Coote (ed), The Welfare of  Citizens: Developing New Social Rights
(Institute for Public Policy Research 1992) 18; S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive
Duties (OUP 2008) 3; see also A O’Hear, ‘Hayek and Popper: The Road to Serfdom and the Open Society’ in
E Feser (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Hayek (CUP 2006) 134; D King and F Ross, ‘Critics and Beyond’ in
F G Castles, S Leibfried, J Lewis, H Obinger and C Pierson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of  the Welfare State
(OUP 2010) 46.
24 A M Rees, ‘The Promise of  Social Citizenship’ (1995) 23(4) Policy and Politics 313, 316; L Welsh,
‘Neoliberalism and Access to Justice: Some Preliminary Findings’ (Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual
Conference, University of  York March 2013); M Jacobs and T Wright, ‘Tax and Spending (Again)’ (2013) 84(2)
Political Quarterly 177.
25 Rees (n 24) 316.
26 Articles 1 and 13 ECHR.
interference,27 or only be realisable through removal of  constraints on individuals’ freedom
to live as they see fit, such as lack of  economic opportunity, education or health.28
The contention that the courts should not and cannot intervene in the social sphere
has become increasingly indefensible.29 Civil, political, social, economic and cultural
rights stand together in various documents30 and the European Court of  Human Rights
(ECtHR) recognises no ‘water-tight division’ between kinds of  rights.31 Van Bueren
argues that litigation on South Africa’s constitutional duties in relation to housing32
‘hammered the final nail into the coffin of  non-justiciability’ to the extent that judges who
accept their own lack of  responsibility for upholding socio-economic rights are as much
engaged in a ‘political exercise’ (here to determine the extent of  their own remit) as those
who adopt a more interventionist approach.33 However, the constitutional entrenchment
of  justiciable social rights in South Africa and a number of  other states remains the
exception rather than the rule.34
Claims of  qualitative difference between types of  rights are particularly difficult to
sustain in the UK. With no one set of  rights privileged with entrenched constitutional
protection,35 rights in any sphere can potentially be created, enhanced, diminished or
abolished by a government with a parliamentary majority.36 Here, the key distinction is
between rights that form part of  domestic law and those contained in international
agreements that, although ratified by the state, have not been incorporated into domestic
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27 For discussion, see B Dickson (guest ed), Special Issue: Positive Obligations and the European Court of
Human Rights (2010) 61(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly; in particular, B Dickson, ‘Positive Obligations
and the European Court of  Human Rights’ (2010) 61(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 203, 203, argues
that ‘a duty to not do something can always (or virtually always) be re-phrased as a duty to do something’ and
that ‘the idea that human rights can be adequately protected if  states content themselves with merely standing
by and doing nothing has become patently absurd’.
28 Fredman (n 23) 11.
29 For discussion, see I Byrne, ‘A Legal Right to Wellbeing’ (2005) 53 European Lawyer 54; E Palmer, Judicial
Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Hart 2007).
30 Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of  10 December
1948; Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (2007/C 303/01).
31 Airey v Ireland, App no 6289/73 [1979] 2 EHRR 305, para 26; Stec and Others v UK [2006] ECHR 65731/01,
65900/01 para 52 (2006) 8(1) European Journal of  Social Security 77; 93; see also E Myjer, ‘The European
Court of  Human Rights and Social Justice’ in I Lintel, A Buyse and B McGonigle Leyh (eds), Defending Human
Rights: Tools for Social Justice (Intersentia 2012).
32 Government of  the Republic of  South Africa, the Premier of  the Province of  the Western Cape, Cape Metropolitan Council,
Oostenberg Municipality v Irene Grootboom and Others, judgment of  the Constitutional Court, 4 October 2000.
33 G van Bueren, ‘Including the Excluded: The Case for an Economic, Social and Cultural Human Rights Act’
(2002) Public Law 456; see also King (n 21) 3; for further discussion of  the ‘political’ nature of  judicial views
of  the remit of  the courts, see C Gearty, ‘On Fantasy Island: British Politics, English Judges and the European
Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 1.
34 M Fordham, ‘Social Rights’ (2013) 18(4) Judicial Review 379, 380.
35 This is in contrast to the USA – see M T McCluskey, ‘Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State’ (2003) 78(2) Indiana Law Journal 783, 791.
36 See, for example, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, c 33, alleged to curb citizens’ rights to freedom
of  movement, assembly and political expression; see also Rees (n 24); that Parliament’s freedom to legislate
thus may not be completely unrestrained is suggested in Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, para 102
(Lord Steyn), albeit that in many cases the constraints applicable to parliamentary power are self-imposed –
ibid, para 105 (Lady Hale).
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law through legislation.37 The ECHR does occupy a privileged position in UK law, but this
is not because the rights conferred are civil and political rather than socio-economic –
numerous applicants have sought to use the ECHR in defence of  socio-economic rights38
– but because of  its incorporation through the Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional
legislation for the devolved regions.39 The obligation on public authorities in Article 3(1)
UN Convention on the Rights of  the Child (UNCRC) to consider the best interests of  the
child when taking decisions affecting him or her also forms part of  domestic law in ‘spirit,
if  not the precise language’ and, as shall be discussed in section 4, may have implications
for socio-economic rights in cases involving children.40 Otherwise, a range of  instruments
concerned with socio-economic rights have been ratified by the UK but do not form part
of  domestic law.41 According to international law, such instruments are legally binding on
state parties,42 a position accepted to some extent by the UK in its statement that it does
not ‘ratify treaties unless confident that domestic law and practice is consistent with them’43
and in the requirement that ministers act in accordance with international obligations.44
However, in the dualist system there is no mechanism that requires compatibility of
domestic legislation with international law: ‘the sovereign power of  the Queen in Parliament
extends to breaking treaties’.45 Nor can any action be brought in the UK courts on the basis
of  infringement of  a right conferred by a non-incorporated agreement, although
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
37 Cook and Another v Sir James Gordon Sprigg [1899] AC 572, 577 (Lord Halsbury); Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v
Department of  Trade and Industry and Others; Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of  Trade and Industry; Maclaine
Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council [1990] 2 AC 418, 500 (Lord Oliver); J H Jackson, ‘Status of  Treaties
in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’ (1992) 86(2) American Journal of  International Law 310; 
A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson Education 2003) 310–12.
38 For discussion, see A Gómez Heredero, Social Security as a Human Right: The Protection Afforded by the European
Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Files no 23, Council of  Europe Publishing 2007); M Cousins, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Social Security Law (Intersentia 2008); B Toebes, M Hartlev, A Hendriks
and J Rothmar Herrmann, Health and Human Rights in Europe (Intersentia 2012); Myjer (n 31).
39 Human Rights Act 1998, c 42; Scotland Act 1998, c 46, s 29(2); Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 6(2);
Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32, s 81.
40 R on the Application of  SG and Others (Previously JS and Others) v Secretary of  State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC
16, para 82 (Lord Reed); UNCRC, adopted by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of  20 November 1989,
entry into force 2 September 1990, UN Treaty Series, vol 1577, 3; Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995,
no 755 (NI 2); Children Act 2004, c 31, s 11; Rights of  Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2010,
nawm 2, s 1.
41 Examples of  relevance to the present discussion include ILO C102 – Social Security (Minimum Standards)
Convention (Geneva, 28 June 1952, entry into force 27 April 1955); ESC (Turin, 18 October 1961, entry into
force 26 February 1965, ETS035); ICESCR, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI),
16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, UN Treaty Series, vol 993, 3; the remaining UNCRC
provisions.
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 1980, UN
Treaty Series, vol 1155, 331, Article 26.
43 United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Implementation of  the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Fifth Periodic Report submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of  the Covenant
(E/C12/GBR/5, United Nations Economic and Social Council 2008) para 50.
44 HM Government, Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office 2010) para 1.2.
45 Salomon v Commissioners of  Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116, 143 (Diplock LJ); see also In the Matter of  an
Application by Caoimhin Mac Giolla Cathain for Judicial Review [2009] NIQB 66, in which it was held that the UK’s
ratification of  the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages could not in itself  override the
Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) 1737 requirement that court proceedings and documents be in English.
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interpretation of  the ECHR rights and UK legislation can be shaped by those set out in
such documents.46
This paper is not concerned with the principle of  the sovereignty of  the Queen in
Parliament.47 The devolved legislatures are not sovereign and can only act within the
competences delegated.48 If  Parliament has been careful to reserve the right to legislate
contrary to the ECHR, albeit against a strong presumption that it should not do so, no such
flexibility is afforded to the devolved regions. These institutions therefore could be
compelled to act in accordance with other international law. Although the Agreement
suggests that this ought to be the case, at least in respect of  Northern Ireland, current
arrangements do not appear sufficiently robust to achieve the objective.
2 Human rights in the Agreement
Human rights feature prominently in the Agreement, most notably in the chapter on
‘Rights, safeguards and equality of  opportunity’. This commences with a declaration that
the signatory parties ‘affirm their commitment’ to eight almost exclusively civil and political
rights, the exception being the right to ‘equal opportunity in all social and economic
activity’.49 More substantively, the chapter includes a commitment to establish a Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) and, on the part of  the UK government, to
legislate for the incorporation of  the ECHR into Northern Ireland law so as to render non-
compliant legislation invalid. The remit of  the NIHRC is to include the identification of
rights ‘supplementary’ to those in the ECHR that require similar protection on the basis of
the ‘particular circumstances of  Northern Ireland’, which, collectively with the ECHR
rights, are to form a regional Bill of  Rights.50 The further requirement that Parliament
‘legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom’s international obligations are met in
respect of  Northern Ireland’ is also of  relevance given that those obligations include the
rights protected by a range of  additional agreements ratified by the state.51 The extent of
progress on each of  these commitments varies.
Incorporation of  the ECHR into the law of  Northern Ireland has been delivered: the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 stipulates that any Act of  the Assembly, piece of  subordinate
legislation or act of  a minister in the devolved Executive that is ‘incompatible with any of
the Convention Rights’ (as defined by the Human Rights Act 1998) is outside the
competence of  the Assembly and therefore invalid.52 Similar provisions are found in the
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46 Demir v Turkey [2009] App no 34503/97 48 EHRR 54, para 85; see also Sidabras v Lithuania [2006] App no
55480/00, 59330/00 42 EHRR 6, in which the court draws on Article 1(2) ESC when considering a complaint
based on Articles 8 and 14 ECHR; for discussion of  the use of  the ECHR by the courts as an aid to statutory
interpretation prior to its incorporation, see M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 1997) 131.
47 Other authors have questioned or identified exceptions to the general rule that Parliament can legislate exactly
as it deems fit – see Bradley and Ewing (n 37) 60; D Sharp, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Scottish Perspective’
(2010) 6(1) Cambridge Student Law Review 135.
48 Scotland Act 1998, c 46, s 29; Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 6; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32,
ss 80–2, 94.
49 The Agreement (n 1) c 6, para 1.
50 Ibid c 6, paras 2, 4.
51 Ibid c 3, para 33.
52 Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 6(2), s 24; Human Rights Act 1998, c 42, s 6.
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constitutional legislation for both Scotland and Wales.53 The ECHR rights are afforded
stronger protection in the devolved regions than in UK law generally. The Human Rights
Act 1998, whose own future may be in doubt after the 2015 general election delivered a
Conservative majority,54 allows the courts to declare an Act of  Parliament or piece of
subordinate legislation to be wholly or partially incompatible with the ECHR. However, the
court may not invalidate primary legislation, or subordinate legislation where ‘the primary
legislation concerned prevents removal of  the incompatibility’; nor does a declaration
impose any legal requirement on ministers to remedy the incompatibility.55 In contrast, Acts
of  the devolved legislatures can be, and have been, declared invalid; in Salvesen, the court
disapplied one provision of  a Scottish Act with immediate effect and allowed a second to
continue to have effect for a maximum of  one year to allow the incompatibility to be
remedied.56 In Northern Ireland, it appears that litigation could be commenced with the
sole purpose of  proving incompatibility;57 the High Court has held that the NIHRC could
bring proceedings without itself  being a victim of  the incompatibility as long as the
existence of  a victim or potential victim could be demonstrated.58 Further, a Bill or
proposed Measure that has completed its passage through a devolved legislature may be
referred to the UK Supreme Court prior to royal assent if  the Lord Advocate, Advocate
General, Counsel General or Attorney General (depending on the region) considers it may
fall outside the legislative competence of  the region.59
While the devolved legislatures are each prevented from legislating contrary to the
ECHR, the Agreement’s proposal for a regional Bill of  Rights is unique to Northern
Ireland. Progress on this front has been more limited. The NIHRC completed its
designated task with the presentation of  its recommendations to the Secretary of  State in
2008.60 However, this has not resulted in the publication by the UK government of
proposals for a Bill of  Rights, which, according to the Agreement, should be binding on the
Northern Ireland Assembly in the legislative process in the same way as the ECHR.61 The
principal reason for this lack of  progress appears to be NIHRC’s recommendation that a
Bill of  Rights should protect a range of  socio-economic rights and dispute as to whether
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
53 Scotland Act 1998, c 46, ss 29(2), 54; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32, ss 81, 94, 108; although Stewart
has questioned whether Parliament really intended to put in place ‘two competing human rights . . .
jurisdictions’ for the devolved regions, the effect of  the legislation seems clear – see A Stewart, ‘Devolution
Issues and Human Rights’ (2000) 30 Scots Law Times 239; I Jamieson, ‘Relationship between the Scotland
Act and the Human Rights Act’ (2001) 5 Scots Law Times 43.
54 O Bowcott, ‘Cameron’s Pledge to Scrap Human Rights Act Angers Civil Rights Groups’ The Guardian
(London 1 October 2014) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/oct/01/cameron-pledge-scrap-human-
rights-act-civil-rights-groups > accessed 9 October 2014.
55 Human Rights Act 1998, c 42, s 4; N Bamford, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998’
(1998) Public Law 572; Lord Irvine of  Lairg, ‘The Impact of  the Human Rights Act: Parliament, the Courts
and the Executive’ (2003) Public Law 308.
56 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] HRLR 23; the offending provisions were Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003,
asp 11, s 72(6) and (10).
57 Normally, and previously in Northern Ireland, a case under the Human Rights Act 1998 or ECHR may only
be brought by a victim of  a rights violation – see Human Rights Act 1998, c 42, s 7; Article 34 ECHR; Klass
v Germany [1978] 2 EHRR 214; Re Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People’s Application for
Judicial Review [2009] NI 235.
58 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review [2012] Eq LR 1135, para 41 (per
Treacy J); this judgment is on the basis of  Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 71(2B).
59 Scotland Act 1998, c 46, s 33; Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 11; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32,
s 99.
60 NIHRC (n 10).
61 The Agreement (n 1) c 3, para 26(a).
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the protection of  such rights represents an appropriate response to the ‘particular
circumstances of  Northern Ireland’. ‘Constitutional borrowing’ and ‘internationalisation’
are frequently central to the drafting of  Bills of  Rights,62 as is arguably reflected in the
Agreement’s statement that a Bill might draw ‘as appropriate on international instruments
and experience’.63 Proponents of  the entrenched protection of  socio-economic rights
further argue that many of  the ‘particular circumstances of  Northern Ireland’ are social,
economic and cultural in nature, highlighting the link between socio-economic disadvantage
and civil unrest and the potential for such rights to catalyse political engagement on a basis
other than community affiliation.64 On the other hand, critics argue that the inclusion of
socio-economic rights derived from international agreements – and therefore applicable to
a wide range of  societies – does not result in a proposal sufficiently tailored to the
‘particular circumstances of  Northern Ireland’.65
Such debates aside, current political realities appear to offer limited prospect of  a Bill of
Rights including socio-economic rights being enacted in the foreseeable future. In Northern
Ireland, unionist political parties have strongly opposed the NIHRC’s recommendations in
their current form.66 At UK level, the Prime Minister has also expressed scepticism about
the NIHRC proposals67 and the Northern Ireland Office has argued that socio-economic
rights ‘are equally as relevant to the people of  England, Scotland and Wales as they are to
the people of  Northern Ireland and, therefore, fall to be considered in a UK-wide context’
rather than at regional level.68 Given the recommendations of  the UK Commission on a
Bill of  Rights69 and the ‘antipathy’ of  politicians and media to ‘the expansion of  a “human
rights agenda”’,70 the prospects of  socio-economic rights thus gaining enhanced protection
seem equally scant. In Northern Ireland, desire to see the enactment of  a Bill of  Rights –
any Bill of  Rights – raises the possibility of  a document being produced with a sole focus
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62 A Smith, ‘Internationalisation and Constitutional Borrowing in Drafting Bills of  Rights’ (2011) 60(4)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 867.
63 The Agreement (n 1) c 6, para 4.
64 B Dickson, ‘New Human Rights Protections in Northern Ireland’ (1999) 24 supp (human rights survey)
European Law Review 3, 8; F McCausland, ‘Why Northern Ireland (Still) Needs a Bill of  Rights’ (Groundhog
Day: Five Years on from the Bill of  Rights Advice, Belfast December 2013); P Kelly, ‘Why Northern Ireland
(Still) Needs a Bill of  Rights’ (Groundhog Day: Five Years on from the Bill of  Rights Advice, Belfast
December 2013); A Smith, M McWilliams and P Yarnell, ‘Political Capacity Building: Advancing a Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland’ (Transitional Justice Institute 2014); see also Hillyard et al (n 6).
65 Harvey and Russell (n 6); Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, ‘A Bill of  Rights for Northern Ireland: An
Interim Statement’ (HC236, incorporating HC360 i and ii, The Stationery Office 2010) ev 14–19; T Hadden,
‘How the Bill Was Lost’ (2010) (September) Fortnight, <www.nuzhound.com/articles/
Fortnight/arts2010/sep10_how_Bill_was_lost__THadden.php> accessed 10 January 2014; T Hadden, ‘A
Constitutional Bill of  Rights for Communities and Individuals in Northern Ireland (Not a Bill of  International
Human Rights)’ (Groundhog Day: Five Years on from the Bill of  Rights Advice, Belfast December 2013).
66 J Donaldson, HC Deb 8 July 2009, vol 495, col 956; Democratic Unionist Party, ‘Manifesto 2009: 1 Dodds’
(Democratic Unionist Party 2009) 26; Ulster Unionist Party, ‘Ulster Unionist Party Position on a Bill of  Rights’
(Ulster Unionist Party, year unknown).
67 ‘Tories Will Not Take McWilliams’ Path – Cameron’ News Letter (Belfast 27 May 2009)
<www.newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/tories-will-not-take-mcwilliams-path-cameron-1-1885137> accessed
7 January 2014.
68 Northern Ireland Office, ‘A Bill of  Rights for Northern Ireland: Next Steps’ (Consultation paper, NIO 
2009) 17.
69 Commission on a Bill of  Rights, ‘A UK Bill of  Rights? The Choice before Us: Volume 1’ (Commission on a
Bill of  Rights 2012) 34.
70 B Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (OUP 2013) 36.
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on a limited range of  civil, political and cultural rights around which consensus can be
reached, with social and economic rights sidelined.71
The third Agreement provision of  relevance to the protection of  human rights, that
Parliament should legislate to ensure fulfilment of  the UK’s international obligations in
Northern Ireland, has thus far attracted less attention from academic authors and
campaigners; the commitment has largely slipped from the agenda. This oversight appears
surprising for a number of  reasons. First, as a party to the Agreement, the UK
government makes an explicit commitment to ensure its international obligations are met
in respect of  Northern Ireland, whereas its only firm commitment in respect of  a Bill of
Rights is to take account of  the NIHRC’s advice ‘on the scope for defining, in
Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in [the ECHR]’.72 Second,
section 3 will suggest that the means by which Parliament has chosen to fulfil this
commitment in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 may be portrayed as flawed. Third,
insertion of  a provision requiring that devolved legislation comply with, for example, the
European Social Charter (ESC) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) into s 6 and s 24 of  the 1998 Act would immediately put the
rights set out in those documents on equal footing with those in the ECHR without the
convoluted process of  negotiating and drafting a Bill of  Rights73 that the NIHRC
envisages would be strongly influenced by them.74 If  amendment of  the 1998 Act might
seem a mundane means of  protecting rights compared to achievement of  the enactment
of  a Bill of  Rights that has been assigned totemic status,75 it should be remembered that,
in the UK, an Act of  Parliament called a Bill of  Rights is legally no different from any
other Act of  Parliament: it would be no more binding on the Northern Ireland Assembly
and no better protected from repeal should Parliament change its mind.
That the ECHR has some relevance to the protection of  socio-economic rights has
been noted in section 1 and will be of  interest in section 4. Little more need be said about
proposals for a Bill of  Rights as the political climate is such that the delivery in the near
future of  a Bill including enhanced protection for social and economic rights appears
fanciful. Further consideration of  how the UK government might deliver on its
commitment to ensure international obligations are met in Northern Ireland is required and
forms the focus of  section 3.
3 Ensuring compliance with international law in the devolution settlement
The UK government’s commitment to ensure that the state’s obligations under
international law are realised in Northern Ireland is clearly stated in the Agreement. One
means of  doing so is provided for in the constitutional legislation for all three devolved
regions. However, it is argued here that this approach, based on political rather than judicial
enforcement, is too dependent on voluntary action by the UK government of  the day to
offer effective protection of  human rights. An alternative model, also used in all devolved
regions but applicable only to the ECHR and EU law, not to other international law, has
potential to underpin a more robust, judicial guarantee of  the rights the state has committed
to uphold on behalf  of  its citizens.
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71 Discussion at ‘Political Capacity Building: Advancing a Bill of  Rights for Northern Ireland’ (report launch,
Stormont October 2014).
72 The Agreement (n 1) c 6, para 4.
73 For discussion of  the process, see Harvey and Russell (n 6).
74 See NIHRC (n 10) 45–51.
75 For details of  the ongoing campaign in favour of  a Bill of  Rights, see <www.billofrightsni.org>.
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The devolution legislation empowers the Secretary of  State to ensure devolved ministers
comply with the UK’s international obligations by directing them to take, or not to take,
certain actions as necessary.76 Such actions may include the making of  secondary legislation
and the introduction of  a Bill to the devolved legislature.77 Primary legislation may not be
revoked by order, but the Secretary of  State could presumably direct that a minister in a
devolved administration introduce a Bill to amend or repeal a previous Act or Measure. It
is therefore possible for the devolved institutions to be bound by unincorporated
international law in a way that Parliament is not. However, this is dependent on the exercise
of  political discretion by the UK government, not on enforcement by an independent
judiciary: the Secretary of  State is not obliged to direct that a particular action be taken or not
taken even if  it appears that international obligations are likely to be breached.
In contrast, under the ECHR model, which is outlined in section 2 above, it is not for
the Secretary of  State but for the courts to decide whether devolved legislation or acts of
devolved ministers comply with the ECHR and, if  appropriate, to declare legislation invalid
or (as in Salvesen)78 to order amendment. This means that a decision as to whether to
challenge the validity of  legislation lies with a victim whose rights have allegedly been
infringed or (in Northern Ireland) with the NIHRC, or (prior to royal assent) the Advocate
General, Lord Advocate, Counsel General or Attorney General;79 the ultimate decision on
compliance rests with the courts, not with a politician who may or may not wish to
investigate or act upon possible non-compliance in a given case. Invalidity because of  lack
of  devolved competence is not limited to non-compliance with the ECHR. An Act of  the
Northern Ireland Assembly would also be invalid if  contrary to EU law, purporting to apply
outside Northern Ireland, dealing with an excepted matter, discriminatory on the basis of
religious belief  or political opinion80 or, perhaps, violating ‘constitutional common law
principles’.81 Some similar grounds for invalidity exist in Scotland and Wales.82
A hierarchy of  means of  ensuring compliance with international law therefore emerges.
Although international treaties in principle place a legal obligation on state parties to fulfil
the obligations entered into,83 to which the UK at least pays lip-service,84 in practice there
is often no means of  enforcing these obligations. Accountability mechanisms are often
political rather than legal, such as the reports on compliance produced by the European
Committee of  Social Rights (ECSR) and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR); even where a judicial body exists, the UK may not agree to its jurisdiction,
as with the procedures instituted by the optional protocol to the ICESCR and the additional
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76 Scotland Act 1998, c 46, s 58; Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 26; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32,
s 82.
77 For discussion of  whether Acts of  the Scottish Parliament represent primary or subordinate legislation, see
A McHarg, ‘What is Delegated Legislation?’ (2006) Public Law 539.
78 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] HRLR 23.
79 Such a challenge has occurred, although not on human rights grounds – see Local Government Byelaws (Wales)
Bill 2012 – Reference by the Attorney General for England and Wales [2013] 1 AC 792.
80 Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 6(2); the 1998 Act stipulates some grounds for invalidity other than those
listed above.
81 Re CM’s Application for Judicial Review [2013] NIQB 145, para 4, 13 (Treacy J).
82 Scotland Act 1998, c 46, s 29; Government of  Wales Act 2006, c 32, ss 80, 94, 108; Axa General Insurance v
Lord Advocate [2012] 1 AC 686, para 51 (Lord Hope), para 143 (Lord Reid).
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (n 42).
84 United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland (n 43) para 50; HM Government (n 44) para 1.2.
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protocol to the ESC, neither of  which has been signed by the state.85 No legislature or state
institution could be compelled to abide by the terms of  such instruments in the absence of
specific domestic law to that effect. The current model in the devolution legislation
provides one means of  compelling a devolved legislature to do so. This approach has the
advantage of  not requiring a complaint from an individual who claims his or her rights have
been infringed, but is weakened by reliance on political rather than judicial enforcement. If,
as shall be discussed in section 4, the UK government may be accused of  non-compliance
with its international obligations in a given field, it could hardly be expected to hold a
regional administration to account for the same failings. The ECHR model, as it applies at
devolved level, is much more robust, providing for the invalidation of  non-compliant
legislation by the courts on the basis of  non-compliance alone, independent of  political
calculation. The need for an individual who has suffered an alleged rights violation to
initiate proceedings might in some cases prevent non-compliant legislation being exposed
to judicial scrutiny due to the absence of  a willing applicant, but in Northern Ireland at least
the ability of  the NIHRC to litigate in its own name in the absence of  a named victim
addresses this risk. A similar model for other human rights instruments would not only
greatly strengthen their judicial weight, but would require their closer consideration in the
political process.
A revised s 6 of  the Northern Ireland Act 1998, amended with this objective in mind,
might then read:
6. Legislative competence
(1) A provision of  an Act is not law if  it is outside the competence of  the
Assembly.
(2) A provision is outside that competence if  any of  the following paragraphs
apply—
. . .
(c) It is incompatible with any of  the rights set out in the relevant
Agreements.
. . .
(2A) In s 6(2)(c), the relevant Agreements are:
(a) The European Convention on Human Rights
(b) Those articles of  the European Social Charter accepted by the United
Kingdom
(c) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of  the Child
Subsection 2A could be then amended over time to incorporate such international
instruments as the UK government deemed ought to be binding on the devolved
institutions.
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85 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter providing for a system of  collective complaints
(Strasbourg, 9 November 1995, entry into force 1 July 1998, CETS158); Optional Protocol to the ICESCR
adopted by General Assembly resolution 63/117 (LXIII), 5 March 2009, GAOR 63rs, sess, supp 49; see also
Council of  Europe Treaty Office, ‘Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System
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(UN 2014). <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CESCR
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The key question for this section is whether the UK government has lived up to its
commitment in the Agreement to ensure fulfilment of  its international obligations in
respect of  Northern Ireland. Certainly, through s 26 of  the Northern Ireland Act 1998,
Parliament confers upon the Secretary of  State the power necessary to ensure that the
Assembly and Executive do not act contrary to the state’s international obligations. This in
turn must create a significant incentive for those institutions to ensure their actions are
compliant with international law. Indeed, there is evidence of  this obligation being taken
seriously at regional level, in the form of  Assembly committee investigations in Northern
Ireland86 and legislation in Wales.87 However, should a regional legislature act contrary to
human rights obligations, the Secretary of  State is under no obligation to intervene. When,
as in section 4, the source of  the alleged rights infringement is UK legislation whose
provisions are essentially being duplicated in the devolved region, such an intervention must
be particularly unlikely. In such circumstances, the only truly effective protection of  human
rights may be through the judiciary.
4 Enter the Welfare reform Bill: the potential impact of judicially protected
socio-economic rights
The Welfare Reform Act 201288 may be fairly described as the flagship legislative
achievement of  the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition government of  2010 to
2015. The main stated objectives of  the Act may be described as (1) simplification of  the
social security system, (2) encouragement of  transition from benefits to employment and
(3) ‘fairness’ to those in employment.89 The means employed in pursuit of  these objectives
have generated considerable hostility from civil society campaign groups90 and from
devolved governments. If  the most vocal opposition has arguably come from Scotland’s
governing Scottish National Party,91 of  the devolved regions only Northern Ireland is
currently in a position to translate its concerns about UK government policy into a
distinctive regional approach.92 However, given the long-established convention that the
region’s social security system mirror that in Great Britain, underpinned by its weak fiscal
position and the statutory requirement to consult the UK government on the desirability of
maintaining common provision,93 a compelling case would have to be made for any
significant policy divergence. The extent to which such a case can be made may depend in
large measure on the implementation of  the human rights provisions of  the Agreement.
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86 Ad-hoc Committee, Report on Whether the Provisions of  the Welfare Reform Bill are in Conformity with the Requirements
for Equality and Observance of  Human Rights (NIA 92/11–15, Northern Ireland Assembly 2013).
87 Rights of  Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011, nawm 2, which is designed to enhance the
status of  UNCRC in that region.
88 Welfare Reform Act 2012, c 5.
89 See I Duncan Smith, HC deb 9 March 2011, vol 524, col 919; Department for Work and Pensions (DWP),
‘Simplifying the Welfare System and Making Sure Work Pays’ (DWP 2014)
<www.gov.uk/government/policies/simplifying-the-welfare-system-and-making-sure-work-pays> accessed
27 August 2014.
90 See, for example, P Walker, ‘UK Uncut Joins Fight against Welfare Reform Bill’ The Guardian (London 
25 January 2012) <www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jan/25/uk-uncut-welfare-tax-disability> accessed 27
August 2014.
91 See Sturgeon (n 18) col 4943; Scottish National Party, Press Release ‘UK’s Catastrophic Welfare Changes Set
to Bite’ (1 April 2013) <www.snp.org/media-centre/news/2013/apr/uks-catastrophic-welfare-changes-set-
bite> accessed 17 February 2014; N Sturgeon (n 18).
92 The revision of  Scotland’s devolution settlement following the 2014 referendum on independence will include
devolved competence for some aspects of  social security – see Scotland Office (n 20).
93 Northern Ireland Act 1998, c 47, s 87.
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Northern Ireland has since 1920 been the only UK region with devolved competence
for social security.94 However, since 1926 the UK Exchequer has financially underwritten
the maintenance of  a parallel but in almost all respects similar system for the region
compared to that in Great Britain, an approach that would at most points in Northern
Ireland’s history otherwise have represented a heavy, if  not unaffordable, fiscal burden.95
The UK government currently subsidises contributory benefits in Northern Ireland96 and
funds non-contributory benefits in their entirety, at a cost of  £334m and £2.9bn
respectively in 2012–2013.97 This arrangement, which could once readily be portrayed as
the ‘most important item’ of  policy for the ‘removal of  want’ in Northern Ireland,98 has
been increasingly questioned since the 1980s.99 The long delay in the progress – and
ultimate failure – of  the current Welfare Reform Bill100 is the result of  a clash between the
two main parties in the consociational Executive.101 The Democratic Unionist Party has
stressed the fiscal risks associated with abandonment of  parity and (to a lesser extent) the
convention that all UK citizens should enjoy the same social entitlements on the same
terms,102 while Sinn Fein expresses opposition to ‘Tory cuts’ to public services without
providing clear information on how it would fund an alternative approach.103
Public discourses on the desirability or otherwise of  implementing reforms to mirror
those in Great Britain have tended to be political and economic, rather than legal, in nature.
However, the scrutiny process undergone by the Bill does indicate that the Assembly has
been alive to the possibility of  provisions contravening human rights obligations, an ad hoc
committee having been appointed to consider this issue.104 The committee concluded by
majority vote that no specific breaches could be identified. However, concerns about
compliance with specific human rights provisions – particularly Article 8 ECHR and  
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94 The powers of  the Parliament of  Northern Ireland are set out in the Government of  Ireland Act 1920, c 67,
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Ireland Act 1914, c 91, ss 2 and 14.
95 Relevant legislation includes Unemployment Insurance (Northern Ireland Agreement) Act 1926, c 4; Social
Services (Northern Ireland Agreement Act) 1949, c 23; Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act
1992, c 8, s 153; for further details, see J Bradshaw, Social Security Parity in Northern Ireland (Policy Research
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(HC 894, The Stationery Office 2013) 2, 11.
97 Department for Social Development (DSD), Resource Accounts for the Year Ended 31 March 2013 (DSD 2013).
98 B Brooke, HC (NI) Deb 2 March 1949, vol 33, col 37.
99 N Raynsford in HSS Committee, Report on Proposal for a Draft Housing Benefits (NI) Order (NIA 51, 11 May 1983)
appendix 2 calls for the abandonment of  parity in favour of  using Northern Ireland as a testing ground for
new approaches to social security; HSS Committee, Report: Social Security Parity (NIA 141-I, 26 June 1984) 5.3
advocates a special supplementary unemployment benefit and fuel benefit for Northern Ireland; E Evason,
‘Poverty in Northern Ireland’ (1986) 75(300) Irish Quarterly Review 503 argues that higher energy costs mean
levels of  cash benefits that are adequate for Great Britain are not for Northern Ireland.
100 See Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Welfare Reform Bill’ (Northern Ireland Assembly 2015)
<www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/legislation/primary-legislation-current-bills/welfare-reform-
bill> accessed 25 March 2015; Sinn Fein (n 15); Simpson (n 13).
101 Birrell and Gray (n 16) 49.
102 Robinson (n 16); Hamilton (n 16) 10.
103 A Maskey, ‘Sinn Féin Calls for Deferral of  the Welfare Reform Bill’ (Sinn Féin 4 October 2012)
<www.sinnfein.ie/contents/24642> accessed 17 March 2014; Maskey (n 16).
104 Ad-hoc Committee (n 86).
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Article 3(1) UNCRC – were raised in written submissions and Sinn Fein members argued
that the Bill as drafted was likely to result in human rights infringements.105 Simpson argues
that there is a strong possibility of  the sanctions regime for claimants who breach
conditions associated with receipt of  a benefit – that they be available for paid employment,
actively seeking paid employment and/or undertaking activities intended to improve their
prospects of  securing employment – breaching ECHR obligations.106 In particular, it is
argued that by denying access to the financial resources necessary for the satisfaction of
essential needs,107 sanctions applied to households including dependent children may
violate the child’s right to family life under Article 8 ECHR.108 There is also a risk of  non-
compliance with Protocol 1 Article 1 ECHR due to concerns about proportionality,
effectiveness and arbitrariness of  sanctions that mean the public interest test for
interference with an proprietary right may not be passed.109
Given that the Northern Ireland Assembly lacks competence to legislate contrary to the
ECHR, it would be well advised to take these issues into account; indeed, a ministerial
amendment tabled at consideration stage would have limited the maximum duration of  a
sanction in Northern Ireland to 18 months, compared to 36 in Great Britain,110 although
the extent of  support available through hardship payments would have been a matter for
secondary legislation. Changes to the sanctions regime, though, would not address every
potential human rights concern relating to the reformed social security system. Other
particularly controversial features of  the reformed social security system include provision
for compulsory, unpaid work placements,111 reduction of  the maximum available housing
benefit including an under-occupancy penalty for social tenants (commonly referred to as
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105 See, for example, the NIHRC submission at 324, Northern Ireland Welfare Reform Group submission at 344
and the Save the Children submission at 351.
106 M Simpson, ‘“Designed to Reduce People . . . to Complete Destitution”: Human Dignity in the Active Welfare
State’ (2015) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 66; failure to comply with these conditions can result in
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156 weeks – see Jobseekers Act 1995, c 18, part i; Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity)
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108 For the principle that Article 8 may create a positive obligation to provide financial support when the welfare
of  children is at stake, see Ala Anufrijeva v London Borough of  Southwark; R on the Application of  N v Secretary of
State for the Home Department; R on the Application of  M v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2004] 2 WLR
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Commissioners for HMRC v Birmingham City Council [2013]ACD 99, paras 44–6 (Hickinbottom J).
109 Hentrich v France, App no 13616/88) [1994] 18 EHRR 440, para 2; R on the Application of  SRM Global Master
Fund LP v Commissioners of  HM Treasury [2009] UKHRR 1219, para 81 (Stanley Burton LJ and Silber J); 
P T Orebech, ‘From Diplomatic to Human Rights protection: The Possessions under the 1950 European
Human Rights Convention, First Additional Protocol Article 1’ (2009) 43(1) Journal of  World Trade 59;
D Webster, ‘Independent Review of  Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) Sanctions for Claimants Failing to Take Part
in Back to Work Schemes: Evidence Submitted by Dr David Webster’ (Child Poverty Action Group 2014)
<www.cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/CPAG-David-Webster-submission-Oakley-review-Jan-
14_0.pdf> accessed 19 May 2014.
110 Northern Ireland Assembly, ‘Welfare Reform Bill Marshalled List of  Amendments (Annotated)’ (Northern
Ireland Assembly 2015) < www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/legislation/primary-legislation-current-
bills/welfare-reform-bill/marshalled-list-of-amendments-consideration-stage-tuesday-10-february-2015>
accessed 23 February 2015.
111 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Schemes for Assisting Persons to Obtain Employment) Regulations 2013, no 276.
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the ‘bedroom tax’)112 and the capping of  households’ maximum overall benefit income.113
There is no need to discuss in detail the issue of  compulsory work placements, the Supreme
Court having held in Reilly that such schemes do not constitute forced labour contrary to
Article 6 ECHR,114 and therefore do not violate the right to free choice of  occupation in
other human rights instruments.115 The provisions potentially resulting in reduced benefit
income do raise issues regarding compliance with human rights instruments other than the
ECHR, which might mean lack of  competence to legislate contrary to them would have a
profound influence on Northern Ireland’s response to the reforms in Great Britain.
Social security benefits in the UK largely play the role occupied by social assistance116
in continental welfare states of  relieving or alleviating poverty and ensuring a minimum
standard of  living for some of  the most disadvantaged members of  society. Any measure
that results in lower incomes for claimants must therefore raise questions of  compliance
with the presumption of  non-retrogression in social rights.117 This requires that there
should be no diminution of  citizens’ social rights ‘except under specific circumstances’.118
However, specific retrogressive measures may be acceptable if  the state can demonstrate
that it considered all alternatives and that retrogression in this field enables better use of
available resources in pursuit of  the realisation of  the suite of  social rights as a whole.119
While it may be claimed that reform of  out-of-work and disability benefits represents an
unjustified retrogressive step given the reduction of  income that will result for some
claimants,120 it is equally arguable that there is ‘no magic figure [of  public expenditure] that’s
going to guarantee or undermine human rights’ and that decisions as to priorities must
always be made.121 If, as the UK government claims, overall reduction of  public spending
proves beneficial to the economy, realisation of  the full suite of  socio-economic rights
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
112 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, no 213, reg B13, inserted by Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations
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Breaking Human Rights Law?’ (Open Democracy 1 March 2011)
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might be advanced if  this were to lead to increased employment at adequate wages.122 The
Court of  Appeal has already recognised the maintenance or strengthening of  work
incentives by reducing benefit payments to be a ‘fundamental legitimate objective’ capable
of  justifying some negative impact on some claimants.123 Therefore, even if  the relevant
international agreements could be relied on in court, the vagueness of  the non-
retrogression principle means its judicial enforcement would be difficult.
General provisions in the international agreements on what constitutes an acceptable or
adequate living standard also suffer from lack of  precise definition and may therefore be
difficult to translate into a minimum acceptable income,124 other than with reference to
existing UK case law,125 and may in some cases apply specifically to workers rather than all
citizens.126 It might be arguable that the right of  the child to ‘a standard of  living adequate
for . . . physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development’127 ought to be interpreted
in accordance with the income and material deprivation standards established by the Child
Poverty Act 2010,128 but this would have to be tested by the courts.
Specific provisions on social security and social assistance are clearer as to the income
levels required for compliance. The pre-2012 level of  social security benefits in the UK was
already ‘manifestly inadequate’ to comply with the Article 12 ESC provision on social
security,129 being below 40 per cent of  equivalised median income for most claimant
groups. This might form the basis for a legal challenge to the level of  contributory benefits
if  the ESC were justiciable in the UK. Likewise, unemployment benefits have never
matched the level required by Article 66 International Labour Organization Convention 102
(ILO C102), 45 per cent of  an unskilled worker’s wage.130 However, the state pension aside,
most so-called social security benefits in the UK are more akin to the ESC definition of
The Agreement and devolved social security
122 G Osborne, ‘New Year Economy Speech by the Chancellor of  the Exchequer’ (HM Treasury 2014)
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social assistance.131 Their appropriateness is therefore better judged against Article 13. In the
past, the UK has been found to comply with this article, which requires that combined
income from all benefits received should not be ‘manifestly below’ 50 per cent of
equivalised median income.132 This finding can be questioned – other research suggests
childless households on means tested benefits could typically expect an income of  no more
than 30 per cent of  equivalised median133 – and the capping of  benefit income134 has
potential to increase the number of  claimant households with children whose income falls
significantly below the 50 per cent threshold.135 Local housing allowance reform is likely to
have a similar effect if, as housing advisors have reported, landlords are disinclined to
reduce rents in response to resulting reductions in housing benefit, forcing claimants to
redirect a portion of  non-housing benefit income to make up the shortfall.136 The courts
have recognised that the benefit cap discriminates against lone parents, and by extension
against women, but nonetheless held that it did not contravene the ECHR rights as these
negative effects could be justified by the ‘fundamental legitimate objective’ the policy was
introduced to achieve.137 Future ECSR reports will provide further insight into whether
judicially enforceable ESC rights in Northern Ireland might have the potential to result in a
different judgment.
Further potential consequences for social security claimants of  the reforms discussed in
the previous paragraph include loss of  housing due to inability to pay rent or inability to
acquire housing in some areas as landlords become reluctant to let to claimants.138 In the
main, it appears that the socio-economic rights instruments offer such individuals no
additional protection compared to the ECHR, both Article 8 ECHR and the housing-
related provisions of  ICESCR having been mainly interpreted as primarily protecting from
arbitrary eviction rather than conferring an absolute right to a home.139 The best prospect
for an action on the basis of  homelessness so caused would appear to be Article 8 ECHR
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for households including children or Article 3 ECHR for rare adult applicants whose
circumstances are such as to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.
The compliance of  one aspect of  recent social security reform in Great Britain, the
stiffened sanctions regime, with the UK’s ECHR obligations may be questioned. A
judicial challenge on the basis of  Article 8 or Protocol 1 Article 1 would provide welcome
clarification. Further potential issues emerge when the proposed reforms are compared
to the state’s obligations under other international human rights instruments. The non-
retrogression principle may be seen to be sufficiently flexible to allow some retrogression
in some areas, possibly including reduction of  the level of  cash benefits, and is thus likely
to provide a poor basis for a legal challenge to an individual policy decision. Nonetheless,
benefits must be above a certain minimum level to comply with provisions on social
security and social assistance, including Article 66 ILO C102 and Articles 12 and 13 ESC.
As has been demonstrated, the UK’s compliance with at least two of  these three articles
can be questioned.
The practical consequences at devolved level of  non-compliance varies depending on
the region and the instrument concerned. Wales and, until now, Scotland lack competence
for social security and therefore the opportunity to develop an alternative approach. In
Northern Ireland, a finding of  incompatibility of  the sanctions regime with the ECHR
rights would render the Assembly incapable of  following its usual policy of  emulating
social security policy in Great Britain as it lacks competence to legislate contrary to ECHR.
The position in relation to the other instruments is less clear-cut. Both the Agreement and
the Northern Ireland Act 1998 suggest that devolved legislation ought to comply with the
UK’s international obligations generally. However, with enforcement currently in the
hands of  the Secretary of  State, it would be extremely surprising if  the UK government
were on human rights grounds to prevent Northern Ireland following a course central
government had itself  set. As with ECHR at present, judicial oversight would form a more
effective means of  protecting human rights. If  the devolved institutions were similarly
debarred from acting contrary to international law generally, adherence to the Great Britain
model, already under political pressure, could become legally problematic even outside the
narrow field of  sanctions.
Discussion and conclusion
The UK government has given a ‘solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate
implement’ the provisions of  the Good Friday Agreement.140 The extent to which it has
done so in respect of  the document’s human rights provisions is mixed. Incorporation of
the ECHR into the law of  Northern Ireland has been achieved, and in a manner that binds
the devolved legislature to a much greater extent than its incorporation into UK law binds
Parliament. The commitment to consider recommendations from the NIHRC on the
desirable content of  a Bill of  Rights for Northern Ireland might be argued to have been
delivered upon, although it currently seems unlikely that any Bill of  Rights will be enacted
by Parliament as a result, and almost certain that any such Bill would not enhance the
protection of  socio-economic rights beyond that afforded by the ECHR. Finally, the
requirement to legislate to ensure the state’s international obligations are fulfilled in
Northern Ireland finds expression in political oversight of  the actions of  devolved
institutions, but has no judicial element and confers no binding obligation on the Secretary
of  State to take action.
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As a result, protection of  social and economic rights in Northern Ireland is weaker than
would have been the case had these been included in a Bill of  Rights or had other human
rights instruments been afforded equal status to the ECHR in the constitutional legislation.
An approach reflecting the ECHR model would have important implications for current
and future social security reforms considered by the devolved legislature. It is already
possible to question whether the Northern Ireland Assembly has competence to introduce
a sanctions regime equivalent to that now in force in Great Britain, due to possible
incompatibility with the protection of  human dignity underpinned by Articles 3, 8 and
Protocol 1 Article 1 ECHR. If  the ESC, the ILO C102 or the UNCRC were equally binding
on the Assembly, such doubts might extend to the level of  benefits. The long-established
practice of  parity in social security between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, already
under strain to the political controversy that surrounds the UK government reform agenda,
might also become legally difficult to sustain.
Such a development would raise serious economic and fiscal issues which fall beyond
the scope of  this paper. Given the extent of  central subsidy to Northern Ireland’s formally
separate social security system, the affordability of  more generous provision there would
inevitably be questioned, in keeping with the familiar debate over the definition of
‘maximum available resources’ in socio-economic rights instruments.141 Previous literature
has argued that contributory benefits and those benefits that form the core of  the UK’s
‘social union’ are ill suited to regional control or payment at different rates in different
regions.142 Whether the risk of  fiscal difficulties – which could be exacerbated if  claimants
from other regions migrated to Northern Ireland in order to take advantage of  a higher
level of  support143 – could outweigh the requirements of  the international agreements and
whether the UK government should underwrite higher benefit levels if  these were
necessitated by obligations imposed by Parliament would be hotly contested politically. Any
perception from Scotland or Wales that provision for citizens’ welfare in Northern Ireland
had improved in comparison to Great Britain could also be expected to have implications
for demand for full devolved competence in those regions.144
The present paper does not pretend to offer a solution to these complex considerations
that would accompany a strict requirement to comply with socio-economic rights
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agreements applied to a devolved region but not to the national legislature. It does highlight
an apparent gap between the commitments entered into in 1998 by the UK government in
respect of  human rights in Northern Ireland and subsequent legislation (or, in the case of
the Bill of  Rights, lack of). Delivery in full on these commitments would call into question
the policy of  every government of  Northern Ireland since 1920, whether devolved or direct
rule, that social security in the region should almost without exception mirror that in Great
Britain, a policy whose future under the current Executive already appears less certain than
at almost any point in the history of  Northern Ireland.
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